We examine the effects of education on financial decision-making skills by identifying an interesting source of variation in pertinent training. During the 1990s, an increasing number of individuals were exposed to programs of financial education provided by their employers. If, as some have argued, low saving frequently results from a failure to appreciate economic vulnerabilities, then education of this form could prove to have a powerful effect on rates of behavior. The current paper undertakes an analysis of these programs using a previously unexploited survey of employers. We find that both participation in and contributions to voluntary savings plans are significantly higher when employers offer retirement seminars. The effect is typically much stronger for non-highly compensated employees than for highly compensated employees. The frequency of seminars emerges as a particularly important correlate of behavior. We are unable to detect any effects of written materials, such as newsletters and summary plan descriptions, regardless of frequency. We also present evidence on other determinants of plan activity.
Introduction
Since the early work of Becker ( 1967) , economists studying the returns to education have traditiomlly focused on the relation between education and wages. From the perspective of the associated literature, education creates value by conferring skills that are of use to employers. Clearly, however, this is not tie sole economic objective (It'education, In addition to labor market skills, education may also confer decision mding skills. Apart from any affect on labor market performance, tiese decision making skills may improve an individual's ability to weigh alternatives, exploit opportunities, and achieve personal objectives.
Some of the most complex decisions undertaken by ordinary individuals concern financial issues, such as the determination of retirement income needs, or the allocation of resources among alternative investments. Most individuals make these decisions on the basis of their own judgement, rather than with the help of experts, in Iargt part because the market for financial expertise is imperfect (see Bernheim 1994a Bernheim , 1996 , It is thertifore conceivable that appropriate forms of education may improve the quality of personal tinancial decision-making.
Existing evidence cc)ncerning the relation between education and financial choices is quite limited.
Correlations between an individual's general level of educational attainment and his or her rate of saving have been documenttcl by Bernheim ancl Scholz (1993) and Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) .
However, as in the literature on returns to education in labor markets, these correlations may be attributable to other related factors. For example, individuals with greater patience presumably tend to remain in school longer, and to save at higher rates. As noted by those studying the relation between wage and schooling (see e.g. Card, 1995) , causal inferences about the effects of education are potentially misleading unless they are derived from sources of variation in education that are plausibly exogenous.
One particularly pertinent source of variation in education concerns the availability of financial education in the workplace, According to one recent survey, as of 1994, 88 percent of large employers 1 offered some form of financial education, and more than two-thirds had added these programs after 1990. L Typically, employers provide information and guidance on a range of topics related to retirement planning.
While nearly all such programs cover principles of asset allocation, sizable majorities treat retirement income needs (73 percent) and retirement strategies (88 percent). g If, as argued by Bernheim ( 1994a Bernheim ( , 1995a , low saving frequently results from a failure to appreciate economic vulnerabilities, then education of this form could prove to have a powerful effect on rates of saving.
It is doubtful that the availability of employer-based retirement education is entirely unrelated to workers' underlying predispositions to save, However, there are a variety of reasons (discussed below) to believe that employers adopt these programs as remedial measures in instances where employees are disinclined to save. [f this is the case, then cross-sectional estimates of the relation between saving and education may provide lower bounds on the causal effects of education. In addition, since many of these programs have been adopted quite recently, it may be possible to control for an unobsemed predisposition to save by contrasting the behavior of the same individuals before and after educatioml interventions.
In this paper, we study the behavioral effects of tinancial education in the workplace using survey data collected from employers who sponsor pension plans, Our analysis is based in part on estimates of the cross-sectional relations between various forms of education and plan activity. Since the data contain repeated observations on many tirms, they also permit us to evaluate the direction of the probable bias in cross-sectional estimatts by testing the hypothesis that educational is remedial (through an examination of the circumstances under which programs are adopttd or expanded). Moreover, the Iongitudiml data allow us to control explicitly for unobserved (firm-level) fixed effects.
Despite the growing importance of employer-based retirement education, existing evidence on this "'Employeesgelting rnorc Investment education, planning help on the increase," Pensions & Investn~ents, January 23, 1995 , p. 74. 'See Employee Benctit Rcse:lrch Ins[itute ( 1995 . topic is largely confined to qualitative surveys and case studies (see e.g. Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1994 , A. Foster Higgins & Co., Inc., 1994 , Borleis and Wedell, 1994 , or Geisel, 1995 .
One exception is Bernheim and Garrett (1996) , who use a novel household survey to study the effects of these programs. Their analysis is complementary these studies in greater depth below. to the current paper; we discuss the relations between The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After describing our data (section 2), we provide an analysis of the circumstances under which employers offer retirement education (section 3).
While certain kinds of education are more common at organizations that offer self-directed pension plans (such as 401(k)s and 403(h) s), tven employers that offer defined benefit plans (and nothing else) frequently provide some form of financial education, For 401(k) plans in particular, the data indicate that low participation among non-highly compensated employees is a strong predictor of the adoption and/or enhancement of educational offerings. At least in the context of 401(k) plans, education therefore appears to be remedial, in the sense that it is macle available to those who are least inclined to save. In part, this may be a consequence of' non-discrimination requirements, which limit contributions of highly compensated employees as a function of contributions by non-highly compensated employees. Based on this finding, one would expect cross-sectional estimates of the relation between participation (contributions) and education to he biased against the conclusion that education enhances participation and contributions to self-directed plans.
In section 4, we examine factors correlated with participation in and contributions to 401(k) plans.
We find that both measures of activity are significantly higher when employers offer retirement seminars.
The effect is much stronger for non-highly compensated employees than for highly compensated employees. The frequency of seminars emerges as a particularly important correlate of behavior, We are unable to detect any effects ot' written materials, such as newsletters and summary plan description, regardless of frequency. We obtain silmilar results based on longitudinal patterns, as well as for an 3 assortment of estimation methods. In light of the likely bias mentioned in the previous paragraph and discussed in more detail in section 3, these findings are strongly consistent with the efficacy of retirement seminars, and they do not rule out the possibility that other forms of education are also effective.
In studying the relation between 401(k) activity and education, we control for a variety of plan features. The effects of these features are, of course, of independent interest, and have been the subject of several prior analyses (s~e Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 1994 , Papke, Petersen, and Poterba, 1993 , Papke, 1995 , Andrews, 1992 , Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox, 1993 , and Scott, 1994 . Generally, we find that the existence of an employee match is strongly related to 401(k) contributions, and especially to participation, in cross-sections. However, this effect is not readily apparent in longitudinal data. There is relatively little indication that any measure of 40 l(k) activity is significantly related to loan provisions. Investment options have no detectable effect on participation, but contributions tend to be a bit higher when greater flexibility is offered.
The paper CIOSLS with a brief conclusion.
Data
The data for our anal]sis come from the 1993 and 1994 versions of the KPA4G Peat Mat-wick Reriremenf BeneJ/s .$~fmey, [n 1993 . KPMG Peat Manvick selected approximately 1100 employers at random from a list of all the prit'atc and public employers in the United States with at least 200 employees. If they were willing to participa[c again, these same employers were retained for the 1994 survey. Any employers }vho decl incd LOparticipate in 1994 w'erc replaced with a randomly selected employer from the same indust~, region, and emplo}er-size catego~.
In each year, these employers were questioned by telephone about the administration, features, and employee utilization of their retirement plans. Some basic employer data, such as total employees, sales, and industry, are a~ailablc for all respondents. In addition, those employers who have a retirement plan (910 in 4 1993 and 861 in 1994) provide some general information about their plan, including the number of employees co~crcd b> the plan, [he t>pcs of plans offered, and the extent to which financial education and guidance is provided by [he cmplo~cr to help employees invest for retirement. Furthermore, for each type of retirement plan that a [Irm offers, the survey contains detailed questions about its features, eligibility requirements, and emplo!"ec activity.
Those emplo}ers \\"ho offer401 (k) plans (596 in 1993 and 566 in 1994) report the features of their plan, including the availability of an employer match, the matching rate provided, whether hardship withdralvals and loans arc pcrmi[tcd, and lhc number and type of investment options available to a participant in the plan, The sunc> also allo\\s us to determine \vhich employee groups, such as union, salaried, or parttime employees. arc eligible to pafiicipate in the plan. In addition, participation and contribution rates are provided for the cmplojccs eligible for the 40 l(k) plan, Thus, for a large sample of over 500 firms each year, the survey pro~ides a rich set of plan characteristics and utilization rates.
The variables that we focus on in this study fall into Lhrcc catcgorics: basic firm characteristics (where the firm is the unit of analysis for the study); general plan characteristics, cncompnssing all retirement plans offered by the firm; and 40 l(k) plan characteristics.
With respect to the first catcgo~, \ve experimented with a number of basic firm characteristics (including sales and dummy \ariablcs for indust~and region), but generally found that they had very little effect on our rcsul[s, For most of [he results presented in this paper, we have retained only one general firm characteristic: the total number of cmplo!'ces,3
The second group of \ariablcs includes general features of the firm's retirement programs. The most important of these describe the extent to which the firm provides financial education to its employees, Specifically, the survey asks each respondent ho\v often the firm provides summary plan descriptions, employee nelvslettcrs or other periodic publications, investment seminars for all employees, seminars for 3Since the data \\'cre provided 10 us ivithou[ film identities-s, we were limited to information collected by the survey. 5 employees over age 50. and seminars for emplo~ees \vithin a year or two of retirement. Each respondent was aslicd \vhcthcr the firm used lhcse dc~iccs of[cn, sometimes, rarely, or never. To incorporate the qualitative nature of these responses into our analysis. \\e use these responses to create three dummy variables for each educational dcvicc. The first indicates \vhcthcr the device is used often, the second indicates whether it is used sometimes or rarely, and the third indicates it is never used. We combine the responses "sometimes"
and "rarely" because Lhedata have Iimitcd ability to identi~educational parameters, and since the subjective distinctions bet~veen these responses secm the most likely to differ across respondents.4
Other pertinent characteristics of an clmployer's overall retirement program covered by the survey include information on Lhccomposition of rc[ircmcnt plans (e.g. 40 l(k)s, defined benefit, profit sharing, and so forth), and lhc fraction of cmplo!ccs who arc covcrcd by a retirement plan. Unfortunately, the smey collects coverage information on a firm-\\idc basis, rather than plan-by-plan.
The final catego~of \ariablcs includes characteristics of 40 l(k) plans.
for wrhelhcr loans arc pcrmiltcd and \\hclher an employer match is provided.
These include dummy variables
We also calculate a measure of 'The sm~'ey also pl-o~'ides]nfc)lma(ion about other potentially usefil plan features, such as hardship withdrawals and the actual matching l-ateprovided by the ti[m. Unfollunatelv the usefulness of these variables is diminished by data limitations and w'e thel-efore do not include lhem in our specifications. For example, in each year of the survey over 94 percent of employers allow ha]-dship liithdl-awals, so tbcre is no[ enough variation in (he data to examine their effect on plan activity. Also, fewer than 40 percent of lhc employers~vho oftkr an employer match report the actual matching rate. Therefore, incorporating~he actual l-ate in(o ouI-speciticztions \vould severely limit the sample size available for estimation. provides measures of 40 I(k) plan acli~ily for three categories of employees: all, highly compensated (HC), and non-highly compcnsalcd (NHC). All eligible employees are classified as either HC or NHC according to specific rules set forth ill the opplicablc non-discrlrnination provisions. These rules \vere Instituted to ensure an equitable distribution of benefits from pension plans. In the context of 40 l(k)s, they operate by limiting the amounts that highly compensated employees can contribute as a function of contributions by non-highly compensated emplo>ccs. An individual is classified as highly compensated if he or she meets any of a number of specific criteria (c, g. earnings of roughly $100,000 or more, ownership of more than 5 percent of the company, or earnings of roughly $65,000 or more if this amount is in the top quintile of the firm's salary distribution). In addition to participation rates. [hc suncy also provides contribution rates as a percentage of salary for plan participants.~Once agoin, these fig~lres are provided separately for all employees, HC employees, and NHC employees. Taking Lhcproduct of participation rates and average contribution rates conditional on parlicipalion, we obtain average contribution rates conditional on eligibility, Summa~statistics for 40 l(k) participation and contribution rates are provided in Table 1 . Mean participation rates arc sli.ghll! Icss than 60 percent for NHC employees, roughly 80 percent for HC employees, and just over 60 pcrccnt o~crall in both 1993 and 1994. The distribution of participation rates for HC employees is highl! slictvcd (\\ilh oullicrs on the lo\ver tail), causing the median participation rates to be about 10 pcrcentogc points higher than [he mean rates. Participating employees generally contribute between 5 and 7 percent of their salaries,~vith HC employees contributing approximately one percentage point more than NHC employees. In both }cars. contribution rales for eligible employees averaged just under three percent for NHC cmplo}ccs. o~er five pcrccnt for HC employees, and between three and four percent overall.
'While the survey asks foI-the a~cl-age contribution as a percentage of compensation, it is not completely clear from the wording whether it means the average OVCI-contl-ibutors, or the average over eligibles. The designers of (he survey suggest the former is tic nahu-al intcl~retation, Given the data, this interpl-etation appears to be colTect. We calculated the average contribution for companies that lrepolled pallicipation rates from O to 25 percent, 25 to 50 percent, 50 to 75 percent, and 75 to 100 percent. There I\LISno evidence of systcm:~tic variation in contributions over these categories, If companies were repolting the average o\ 'cI-eligibles, then dle a~'clage would (as a purely mechanical matter) have to rise steeply across these catego]-les. 7
The Availability of Retirement Education
As a first step in our anal>sis. we prolidc descriptive information concerning the availability of different kinds of retirement cducalion in the \vorkplace. Overall, in 1993 nearly 74 percent of pension plan sponsors provided summn~plan descriptions, roughly 65 percent distributed newsletters, and just over 44 percent offered rctircrnent scrninars LOall cmplo>ccs. When firms are weighted by total employment, summary plan descriptions and nc~vslcttcrs appear to bc somc~vhat more common (roughly 80 percent in each case), but the frequency of seminars is essentially unchanged (44 percent). The fraction of firms providing summary plan description \vas some]tha[ lo\\cr in 1994 than in 1993, but the fractions providing newsletters and seminars rose slightly.
Since our ullimatc objccti~c is to c~alualc Lherelation between education and behavior, it is important to develop an understanding of [he sources of variation in educational offerings across firms. Plan sponsors are presumably more Iikcly to pro\ide information when participants are required to make decisions. It is therefore natural to spcculatc that [he growlh of educational offerings results in large part from the rising populari~of self-dircc[cd plans sLIchas 401 (k)s and 403(b)s (see EBRI, 1995, or the extended discussion in section 3 of Bcmhcim and Garrett, 1996) . Yet the KPMG Peat Mamvick smey data reveal that seminars, newsletters, and surnman plan dcscrip[ions arc nearly as common among firms with defined benefit plans (43,8 percent, 68.9 pcrccnt. and 73,1 percent, respectively for 1993) as among firm with 40 l(k)s (44.4 percent, 71.2 percent. and 80 I pcrccnt. respectively for 1993).
The preceding finding roiscs Lhc possibility lhat many employers provide retirement education to address general concerns aboul cmplo>ces' preparation for retirement, rather than to equip them with planspccific decision-making skills. One need not construe this as necessarily altruistic. Education may help employees to appreciate Ihc values of lhcir pension plans. By promoting adequate preparation for retirement, an employer may also hope to avoid subsequent conflicts (e.g. over demands for more generous pension benefits) with older, poorly prepared~vorkers. Assistance \vith financial plaming may also enhance employee loyalty, improve labor relations, and boost morale.
Of course, comparisons based on ra~v frcqucncics, such as those described above, maybe misleading, For example, it is common for empto~ers to offer both a defined benefit plan and a supplemental 401(k), It is therefore possible thnt the frequency of cducaliona! offerings at organizations with defined benefit plans in part reflects the prcscncc of sccondav 401(k) plans. Also, it is conceivable that educational offerings may differ systematically by company characteristics that are related to the presence of defined benefit plan.
To investigate this possibility, we estimate probit models explaining the availability of seminars for all employees, seminars for cmplo>fees over 50 years of age, seminars for employees nearing retirement, summa~plan descriptions. and ncljslctlcrs or periodicals. Results are contained in table 2. Explanatory variables include variables measuring the l!pcs and varie~of plans (where the omitted catego~is "only a defined bcnefil plan-'), cmplo!mcnt. plan co~cragc, and year. The data are pooled across years, and the standard errors arc corrcctcd to account for potential correlation across obsemations from the same organization.
Focusing attcn[ion on organizations \vith a single plan, it is evident that seminars of all kinds are most common among non-profit institutions \\iLh 403(b)s. Companies with 40 l(k)s are more likely to offer seminars to all emplo~"ccs thnn companies iiith defined benefit or other kinds of plans, but less likely to offer seminars specifically for older cmplo>ccs. Written materials of all kinds are most commonly used among companies with 401 (k)s. but there are no significant differences between the likelihoods that sponsors of other kinds of plans pro~idc such materials. Thus. \vhilc the rising popularity of self-directed plans may have promoted the groi~lh of ccrtoin Educational offerings, the impetus for this growth appears to be much more general. This is consistent w"iththe findings of Bcmhcim and Garrett (1996) . Table 2 also indicates that educational offerings are significantly more common among organization with multiple plans. Emplo\'ment and coverage are positively correlated with seminar offerings, but not with the availability of ]*TiLtcnmaterials. This may reflect the presence of economies of scale in the provision of seminars. Generally, the f'rcqucncies ofcducational offerings did not change appreciably between 1993 and
1994.
When analyzing the relation bctwccn education and behavior, we must necessarily restrict attention to organizations wilh plans Lha(permit cmplo>ces to make choices. We therefore focus our attention on 401(k)s. Since Lhcdeterminants of education offerings relate to the selection process determining the incidence of "treatment," it is important to reexamine the determinants of these offerings specifically in the context of 40 l(k)s. If, for example, education tends to be offered in response to a demand for information by employees who are naturally inclined to save at high rates, then positive cross-sectional correlations between education and 401 (k) ac[i~'it} could rctlcct selection, rather than the influence of employer-based education on employee behavior. If, on [hc other hand. companies tend to provide education as a remedial measure to employees \Fho arc o[hcm\isc disinclined to save, then the nature of selection could obscure an underlying relation bclwccn education and bcha~ior.
Analogously to lablc 2. table 3 provides estimates of probit models explaining the availability of various educational offerings in the pooled 1993/94 sample, In this instance, however, we have confined attention to companies i~ith 40 I (!i)s. Wc ha~'c OISOadded sc~cral nc!v explanato~variables, including the number of categories of invcstmcn[ options (e.g. cmplo!er stock, guaranteed income contracts, bond funds, equity mutual funds, and so forth) atailablc to participants. and dummy variables indicating whether the plan covers union employ ees," \vhcthcr it provides for an employer match, and whether loans are permitted.
As in table 2, seminars for older workers are more Iikcly when companies offer plans other than in response to emplo>ce demand. [t is also notable that the correlation between seminars and employer matching provisions is ncgati~c (though not siyificant at conventional levels). This is consistent with the view that education and matching are substitutable methods of encouraging participation in situations where employees sho~~-insufficient interest in [hc plan. Not surprisingly, education of all forms is si~ificantly more likely when employers offer participants more int-cslment options. There is also some indication that seminars and loan provisions are positively correlated. The most striking feature of this [able is the pattern of negative coefficients for the initial participation rate of NHC employees in [hc spcci Iicotions explaining changes in seminar offerings. In the case of seminars for all employees, the cocflicicnt is highl! significant: it is marginally significant (i.e. with slightly less than 95°/0 cent'idencc) for lhc other t\\o seminar variables. This implies that low participation among NHC employees is strongly associated \\]th subsequent increases in employer-sponsored seminars. This result does not, however, carry over to \vrillcn materials. No other variable consistently passes tests for statistical significance at con~'entional ICVCIS.The coefficients of the initial HC participation rate are also negative for the seminar variables. but their magnitudes and levels of si~ificance are smaller. With low confidence, the estimates indicate that cducotiona] improvements were more likely among fu-ms with pensions plans that covered larger fractions of employees. Improvements in age-specific seminars were also less common among larger firms and among unionized firms, There is little if any relation between initial pension plan characteristics and subsequent changes In educational offerings.
The paltem documcnlcd in table 4 supporLs the h~~othesis that, in the context of 40 l(k)s, retirement seminars are remedial. These offerings appear to be motivated by low participation among NHC employees. This is consistent Iiith Lhcview that non-discrimination requirements provide a powerful impetus for the provision of retirement cducalion among 401 (k) sponsors, However, it is doubtful that this is the only motivation. If it \vcrc. lhcn high Initial HC participation would also correlate with subsequent increases in education, which is not (I1ccase, The small negatit'c effect of initial HC participation probably reflects the offsetting effects of two separate considerations: first, that employers are inclined to offer education as a remedial measure \\hcn 40 I (k) activit? is loii-(regardless of HC or NHC status), and second, that employers also use education LOaddress binding non-discrimination constraints (which tend to arise when HC participation is high). These findings arc consistent \vith the indirect evidence on selection offered by Bemhcim and Garrett ( 1995), 
Evidence on Participation in and Contributions to 401(k) Plans
In this section \vc use (hc KPMG Peat Manvick plan-level data to examine factors associated with participation in and contributions 1040 l(k) plans. We use cross-sectional data on all the firms in our sample and also examine changes for the same firm over 1993 and 1994. While we focus on the role employer-based education plays in these dccislons, \vc cxfiminc several other plan and firm characteristics that may be related to participation and contributions.
A. Factors affecting participation in self-directed plans
The first step in our anal>sis of401 (k) activity is to examine cross-sectional OLS regressions of plan-Ievel participation rates. Since there arc sirong similarities between the data for 1993 and 1994, and since we are not interested in in~cstigatin.g an! specific hypotheses about the differences between these years, we pool the t~vosumeys. We include a year dummy to account for any systematic factors that might influence participation or Conlribulions diffcrcn[l: through lime As in the previous section, pooling the data raises one important empirical issue: since nlan> of the same fimls were surveyed in both years, it is doubtful that the error terms are indcpcndcnt across all observations. While OLS estimates are still consistent under these conditions, the conkenlional mclhod of computing standard errors is inapplicable. In our reported estimates, we again correct our standard errors to rcllect clustered sampling.
Since nondiscrimination rules arc binding for many employers (Garrett, 1996) , education programs may be designed to encourngc participation b! NHC employees. Moreover, since HC and NHC households start out with different levels of financial sophistication, we would expect financial education to affect their behavior diffcrcnlly. For both reasons, Ire estimate separate regressions for these groups as well as for the combined sample.
Results arc con(aincd in lhc first panel of table 5. The dependent variables for these regressions -the plan participation rates -va~[rem I to 100 pcrccnt. The estimated effects of the key explanatory variables are described beloiv.
i, The role oJseminor.s
For our base-case cstlmatcs. \ve usc dummy variables to measure the intensity (frequency) of educational offerings. In this~vn~.wc a~oid imposing assumptions on the fmctional relation between participation and an arbitrarily scaled rncasurc of education (as discussed in section 2, we do, however, use the same dummy variable 10 represent the responses "sometimes" and "rarely"). In subsection D, we also present results based on a single scalar measure of educational intensity. We also focus exclusively on seminars for all employees, rather than on seminars targeted at employees over 50 or employees near retirement. In practice. Lheseminar variables are highly colinear, and it is difficult to identi~their separate effects~vith precision.
Reading ncross [he firsl [\vo ro\\s of ihc first panel of Table 5 , it is apparent that frequent seminars have a consistently positive and significant cffccl on participation in self-directed plans. For non-highly 13 compensated employees, frequent seminars arc associated \vith participation rates that me 11.5 percentage points higher than plans~vith no seminars. The corresponding figure for highly compensated employees is 6.4 percentage points. TIICSCare economically large estimates given mean participation rates -60 to 80 percent -in the sample. The occasional seminar indicator variable is, however, insignificant in each specification.
The results in tnblc 5 may obscure lhe relation between education and participation among HC employees. Although censoring at Lhcplan Ic\el (at either O percent or 100 percent) is relatively rare for "all" employees and for NHC clmployees. it is much more common for HC employees, Specifically, for 32 percent of the sample, the HC participation ralc is 100 percent. Obviously, increases in seminars and changes in other plan characteristics cannot be associated with higher participation rates for companies that achieve 100 percent HC participation. Wc investigate Lheeffects of censoring in section D, below, where \ve estimate Tobit specifications.
These results arc consistent \\-ith the h>pothcsis that seminars stimulate 40 l(k) participation generally, and especially among NHC cmplo!ecs This implies that retirement seminars may be an effective response to non-discrimination rules. Ho\\cvcr, there is no indication in the pooled results that seminars matter unless they are conducted frcqucntl}.
ii: Other Jtirtns ofedlicall<)n ond in[ormotion dissemination
We include sclcral additional cdl]cation \ariables (newsletters and summary plan descriptions) to examine \vhcthcr all educational and inromlational efforts are equally effective. Summa~plan descriptions typically amount to disclosure of plan characteristics, and contain very little (if any) recognizable education, While it is perhaps conceivable that employees \vould be unwilling to trust (and therefore to participate in) their pension plans~vithout disclosure, tvc \\ould nevertheless be surprised if the use of these materials had a measurable effects on plan acti~il>. [n contrast, nclvsletters often serve the same function as seminars, but provide infomlation throllgh printed, rather that audio-visual media, According to a survey by the Employee Benefit Research Institute. 92 pcrccntof401 (k) participants say that they read these materials, and 33 percent say that thcj con~ributc more [o Lhcir plans as a result. One might therefore expect newsletters to have an effect on behavior similar to thal of seminars, Altcmativcly, individuals may exaggerate their responses to nc\vslcttcrs "appropriate response, "
in response to survey questions, particularly if they perceive this to be the Notably, in the regressions of table 5. aside from seminors, no other medium of providing information and education to emplo!ccs -either through nclvslcttcrs or summary plan descriptions -has any significant association with participation rates. This is consistent }vith the hypothesis that these media have no effect on participation. In principle. selection bias could mask a behavioral response. However, in contrast to seminars, there is little indication in lhc results o[scction 3 that the provision of written materials is motivated by low participation.
iii, I)Ion chclrocterlstics
There is mixed c~idcnce in Lhc Iitcraturc on the effect of matching rates on participation in self-directed plans, despite the fact that matching is ]cn common. According to a 1990 Hewitt and Associates survey, percent of 944 major US. corporations matched employee contributions. Papke (1995) on the view that emplo}cr matching is a Iicy factor in explaining the rapid expansion of 40 l(k) plans. "
However, the 401 (k) sponsored by Lhe firm examined by Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox was part of a profitsharing plan, and hcncc had unusuatly \olatile mntch rates It is not clear that one can generalize from participation responses in profit-sharing plans to more common plan types, where match rates change much less frequently. In principal, we expect matching rates to exert a positive effect on participation since they provide a pure substitution effect at the extensive margin, In all the cross-sectional recessions wc have examined, there is a positive and significant correlation between the exis[cncc ofa match find participation. 9 The regression results in table 5 imply that plans with matches have participolion rates [hat arc 14.6 to 16.9 percentage points higher than plans without matches, Loan provisions alloi( families to borrow against contributions made to the self-directed plan.
Conventional reasoning suggests that eligible w'orkers will be more likely to participate in plans with loan provisions since they \\"ill ha}e access to funds in the event they need to borrow. An alternative view holds that loan provisions \\"ill be ncgati~c]y correlated \vith participation because they exacerbate "self-control" problems \\illl saving (SCCc.g, ShclTrin and Thalcr, 1988) . We find that the correlation between the existence of loan provisions and participation arc positive but insiqificant in the regressions for all employees, and negative but insignificant in the separale regressions for HC or NHC employees.
Having a broad range of investment options presumably increases the attractiveness of participation,
The number of options in these plans is not particularly large, with a mean of 2.8 in 1993 and a mean of 3.7 in 1994, A single investment option can bc narrow (say stock in the employee's company, or a guaranteed life insurance contracts), or broad. like the Fidelih family of mutual finds, Although we expect investment options to be positively correlated \vith participation, this effect is not significant in any specification.
Conceivably, (his finding may be attributable to the coarseness of our measure for the number of options %ecall fi-omsection 2, (hat dalti on lhe Icvcl ofmtltch is missing for a large number of observations so we use only an indicator variable [or whc[her [hc liml tll~crsa mntch.
(e.g., the vast family of Fidelity equi~mutual funds \vould be considered one option).
iv. Firm chorocterlstics
An obvious concern~vith cross-scclionol estimates of the kind considered here is that the variables of interest may bc corrclntcd \vilh unobserved lirm-spccitic characteristic. In that case, the correlations that we attribute to seminars may in ffict reflect other factors. In addition to the plan characteristics already mentioned, we thcrcforc include a set of firm-specific variables to try to account for other pertinent factors.
The existcncc ofothcr pension plans should matter for two distinct reasons. First, other pension plans may be positi~el? correlated Ivi[h participation in a self-directed plan. There is extensive evidence that the existence of a 40 l(k) is posi Li\cl! correlated \\ith employees' tastes for saving (Engen, Gale, and Scholz, 1995; and Bcrnhcim 1996a) . It is likely that the same is true for other pensions. Thus, the presence of pensions may be positi]cly correlated \\itll participation in self-directed plans. Second, other pension plans may reduce the likelihood of participation in a self-directed plan because the pension may provide households with sufficient rctircmcnt sa~ing.
As \vould bc cxpcctcd i[ pcnslons and self-dircctcd plans are initiated in response to employees' wishes, participation rates arc higher in self-dircctcd plans \vhen the sponsoring firms offers at least one other pension plan, The effect for all employees is significant at conventional levels.
There may bc systematic differences in self-directed plan offerings depending on the size of the firm, and on the number of cmplo!'ccs co~.ered b!' the plan. These differences might, for example, arise from economies of scale in plan administration. or from correlations between size and other variables, such as plan age, unobserved dimensions of plan gcnerosih, or the nature of peer goup effects, We include the number of employees in the firm to capture variations in participation that may be associated with firm size, and the fraction of employees covered to capture variations in participation that maybe related to plan size. We find that firm size is nega[ivcll associated \\-ilh participation, but that participation rises significantly with the fraction of emplo>ees co~crcd.
The unionization indicator variable is consistently insignificant across specifications.
v. Sllmrnoty
In pooled cross-scclional rc.gressions. there are a number of factors that are significantly associated with participation, inc]uding match rates and certain characteristics of the company. The effect of frequent seminars is economical]> Iargc, positi~c, slatisticall}' significfint. No other educational variable significantly affects participation. [n light of the sclcclion issue documented in section 3, there is reason to believe that these estimates understate the behavioral impact of retirement seminars, but may accurately reflect the impact of\\Tittcn matcrinls.
B. Factors related to contributions in self-directed plans
As indicated in table 1. the sunc~COIICCIS information on average contribution rates for plan participants, Multiplying the aicrage contribution rate times the participation rate gives the average contribution rate across all eligibles. We use this as our dependent variable to examine contributions.
Because the data arc aggregated across plans, (here is no obvious way to use information on the fraction of nonparticipants and lIIc conditional mean among participants separately without making strong ad hoc assumptions on the data. Since the conditional mean among participants is of limited intrinsic interest, we therefore use the transfom~cd contribution variable.
Obviously, our contributions variable may inherit some of the properties of our participation variable.
Even so, there is no compelling reason (o expect. p priori, that contributions will vaty with education in the same way as participation. To scc Ivh>. consider the follo~ving example. Suppose a firm's employees differ in lheir taste for sa~in.g Those \\ith a high taste~vill participate in self-directed plans when available and, due to the tax subsidy (and possibly employer match), devote a relatively high fraction of sala~to these plans. Employees \\ith low tastes for saving \vill choose not to contribute. Now suppose frequent seminars induce employees \vith lo\v tastes for sa~ing to contribute, If they contribute at low levels, the mean contribution, conditional on participation, may actually fall, unless education also encourages high savers to save even more. It is conceivable. ho~lc~cr, that education might actually reduce saving among those \vho -"'too much" relati~c to standard rules of thumb. Thus, even the unconditional would othenvise put atvam ean of the contribution ra[c might fall \\ith education
As is clear from the second pnncl of Table 5 , the frequent seminar variable is positively and significantly associated \vith contributions for lhc regressions involving all employees and non-highly compensated employees. The cffccl is quite Iargc. Mean (unconditional) contribution rates are around 3.4 percent of salary, so the estimates imply that contributions are nearly 20 percent larger in firms offering frequent seminars. This result is consistent \\ilh the hypothesis that retirement education -and frequent seminars in particular -positivcl! affect (I1csize of contributions to self-directed plans.
In the specification for fill cmplo!ccs. bo[h match rates and loan provisions are positively and significantly associntcd~iith contribution rates. Larger firms have lo~ver contribution rates (the effect is significant for highl!-compensated cmplo}ecs). The larger the fraction of employees covered by a selfdirectcd plan, the higher arc contribution ra[es (the effect is si~iticant for non-highly compensated employees and the all cmp]oyccs specification).
C. Longitudinal evidence on participation and contributions
The specifications displa>cd in table 5 use pooled data from 1993 and 1994. To control for spurious factors that might generate an apparent cross-sectional relationship bet~veen seminars and participation or contributions, \ve included a number of plan-and firm-specific variables. Nevertheless, a skeptical reader might question these rcsul[s on the grounds lhat seminars are correlated \vith other firm-specific characteristics, such as lhc dcyce of interest management takes in their employees, and that these other characteristics arc responsible for lhc obscned correlation \vith behavior (perhaps through plan generosity, \vhich is only impcrfcctl} accounted for in our specification).
As discussed earlier. \vc ha~e observations in both years for nearly 300 firms, Thus, it is possible to repeat our analysis, diffcrcncing Lhcdata for our short (2-year) panel. While differencing removes time-invariant plan-specific characteristics, it also exacerbates any measurement error problems that might be present, making it more difficult to estimate correlations that arise from behavioral relationships.
The first panel oflablc 6 examines participation, repeating the same specification as sho~~n in table 5, but using the firsl-diffcrcnccd data. Allhough the statistical si~ificance of the results is not quite as striking, this is probably to be cxpcclcd because lhc sample size is considerably smaller and because of the problems arising from diffcrcncing short panels. Nevertheless, we find that instituting seminars on a frequent basis is associated with a 7,7 pcrccnlagc point increase in participation rates, and the effect is significant at the 11 percent level for the all-employee sample. For non-highly compensated employees, the effect is 12.1 percentage points. and it is significant nt the 7 pcrccnt level. It is worth noting that the estimated effects of occasional seminars appear s~rongcr in the diffcrcnccd estimates. Indeed, the effects of frequent and occasional seminars no~~appear 10 be roughly proportional.
We~icw this as fllrthcr support for the h}vothcsis that retirement education -and frequent seminars in The second panel of Table 6 examines contributions, repeating the same specification as shown in Table   5 , but using the first-diffcrcnccd dala, The frequent seminar variable is again significant for the non-highly compensated group, and it is marginall} significant in the specification for all employees. The only other significant cocfticicnts (al contcnlional Ic\cls) are the occasional seminar variable (for HC employees) and the unionization variable (for all cmploJccs and HC employees).
D. Robustness
The resull.s prcscntcd in the previous sections depict a strong correlation between frequent seminars and 401 (k) activit>, cspcciali! nmong NHC cmplo}ces. In order to verify the robustness of these results we examine the scnsitivit! of our results to a different method for measuring the intensity of education. We also employ several alternate cs[inlation tcchniqucs: median, robust, and Tobit regression.
In the pret'ious section. there \verc ccL-taincases (most notably difference specifications for participation) \~hcre the effects of frequent seminars were only marginally significant. This may occur, at least in part, bccausc !JC arc asking the data to identify too many parameters. In these same cases, the point estimates for Lhecffccls of occasional seminars arc roughly half of the corresponding point estimates for the effects of frcqucnl seminars (SCClnblc 6). 11is therefore natural to consider an alternate specification based on a scalar measure of educational intensity that allows us to summarize the effects of education through a single parameter. Tnstcrid ofconslnlcting dummy \'ariables based on the frequency of educational offerings, we simply measure frequency on a scale of zero to three, depending on whether education is offered never, rarely, sometimes, or of[cn. This specification forces the effects of an increase in the frequency of education to be the same \\hcn mo~ing from each qualitative response to the next. That is, it assumes that an increase '~n table 6, the occasional pl-o~ision of summaly plan descriptions appears to have a positive and si~ificant effect on participation, Ho\\eveI-, this I-csult is apparently driven by outliers; it vanishes when more robust estimation techniques are applied (as in the next section). 21 from never to rarely has the same c[fcct on participation and contribution rates as an increase from rarely to sometimes or sometimes to oflcn. While restrictive. it is more parsimonious than our original procedure, and is generally not rejected by the data.
We estimate median and robust regression models to reduce the potential influence of outlying observations.' 1 The slandard errors reported for the median and robust recessions (as well as for the Tobit estimates) using the pooled data arc not adjusted for the fact that the same firm may appear in the pooled sample t\vice. As the standard errors ivcrc similar \vith and without this correction in the OLS specifications sho~vn in Table 5 , we do not vieiv this as a major shortcoming.
We use Tobit regressions to account for right and left censoring of participation rates at O and 100 percent. While censoring occurs in the data for all three employee categories, it is particularly prevalent for HC cmployccs. In the pooled dala. Ihc participation rate equals 100 percent for all employees in 29 of 1027 obsewations and for NHC cmplo!ccs in 27 obscmations out of 805. For HC employees this number jumps to 267 of 824 obscnatiolls, or approximatcl: 30 percent of the sample. Left-censored observation (i.e., those for \vhich the participation rate is O pcrccnt) arc not nearly as prevalent. There are no such observations for all employees and NHC cmplo}ccs, and OIIIJ 12 cases for HC employees, We estimate Tobit models only for participation rates using pooled cross-sectional data. While censoring is also present in the difference versions of these models. ns \\ell as in models for contribution rates (both because of the censoring of participation and bccausc of limits on contributions), the Tobit model is inappropriate in these contexts.
We report the cocflicienls of Lhescminnr variables for these alternate specifications in Table 7 and   Table 8 . We omit the coefficients of other explanatory variables to conserve space. Each of these spccihcations employs the same additional covariates as the earlier OLS recessions; results covariates arc similar LOLhosc reported in ptcvious subsections and are available on request.
for these other 1lMedi,an repression accomlllishcs [his by minimizing the sum of the absolute values of the residuals rather than the sum of squal-ed residuals. Robust I-cp-ession iil-st eliminates gloss outliers and then perfoms Huber iterations followed by biweight iterations in orctel-to~fc]ght obscnations more evenly in the loss function.
i, An alternative tneosure oj-senlinar \ntens]ly
For even specification contained in tables 5, 6, 7, and 8, we present results based on an analogous specification in~vhich lie usc a single scalar measure of educational intensity, as described at the outset of this section. The rcsulling cocfllcicnts for seminars arc presented in tables 7 and 8 under columns labeled "intensity." Generally spenklng. for spccilications involving pooled (as opposed to difference) data, the magnitudes and statistical precision of educational effects are similar to the results obtained using separate dummies for frequent and occasional seminars. Ho\\cver, the usc of the seminar intensity variable sharpens the estimates considerably for (he diffcrcnced data. participation rates). the cocflicicnt on For example, in the first column of table 6 (which concerns frequent seminars for NHC employees is only significant at the 7 percent level. Ho\vc\cr. its magnitude is also roughly twice that of the occasional seminar variable, which suggests that LISC of (I1cinicnsit> vnriablc ma! be appropriate. Indeed, as indicated in the first column of table 7, the cstlmnlcd cocflicicnt for [hc intcnsil}' variable in an analogous specification is statistically significant at lhc 1 for all employees. pcrccnt Ic\cl. A similar obscnalion applies to difference estimates of participation rates [n general. \\-ith diffcrcnccd data, the effects of seminars on participation (table 7) and contributions (table 8) arc found to be significant at a higher level of confidence when a single measure of educational intensity-is used.
ii. Median and roh IIst regression. robustne.~s of participation results
We present median and robust regression results for participation in the middle sections of Table 7 . In many respects, these results are qualitative}' similar to the OLS estimates. In the pooled data, the coefficient on frequent seminars for NHC emplojccs drops from 11.5 in the OLS specification to 9.9 in the median and 11.2 in the robust regression. Ho\\c\er. both of [hese coefficients remain significant at the 1 percent level.
The coefficients of occasional seminars for NHC employees rise relative to OLS, but still fail to achieve statistical significance at confcntional levels. There is no indication that seminars -even frequent ones -have a signiiicfint impact on Lhc porticipalion rates of HC employees. It is therefore possible that the effects of frequent seminars on HC cmplo!'ccs measured in OLS recessions (as well as in the Tobit recessions reported later) reflect lhe inllucncc of oulliers. For HC employees, the unexpected negative coefficient (from OLS) on occasional seminars is reduced to a number much closer to zero in both the median and robust recessions. Finally, the effect of frcqucnl seminars on participation rates for all employees is a bit weaker in median regession and robust regressions than for OLS; hoivcver, the effect of occasional seminars, though still smaller than the cf(cct or~rcqucnt seminars. no~v achieves conventional levels of statistical si~ificance.
For the diffcrcnccd data. both the median and robust recessions reduce the size of the coefficients for frequent seminars. but also incrcasc the precision \vith l~hich they are measured. The coefficient on frequent seminars for NHC cmplo!ecs drops from 121 in the OLS specification to 7.4 in the median and 8.6 in the robust regression. Ho\\c\cr. \\hilc the OLS coefficient~vas only significant at the 7 percent level, the median regression cocflicicnt IS significant at lIIc 2 percent Ievcl and the robust regression at the 5 percent level.
Notably, \vhilc the cf[cct of occasional seminars on NHC participation was not significant in OLS estimates with differcnced data. it is significant (and substantial) in both median and robust regression estimates.
Median and robust re~cssions also~icld more prccisc coefficients for HC employees. For the median reg~ession in particular, (IICcffccl is statistically significant, even though its magnitude is small. We suspect that this result is attributnblc to the nature of the distribution of the difference HC participation rates. Many of the participation ra(cs for HC crnplo~ccs arc at or near 100 percent for both 1993 and 1994; consequently, more than 30 percent of the firms in the sample cxpcricnce no change in the measured participation rate of HC employees between 1993 and 1994. Since the median change is zero, and since there are so many zeros, it is not surprising that our explanato~variables are found to have very little effect on the median, or that this finding is precise. The cffcci of frequent seminars on participation rates disappears in the median and robust regression estimates of the diffcrcnccd specification for all employees; however, the impact of occasional seminars emerges as signi ticant. Final I!, as noted earlier the use of the intensity variable also enhances the statistical signilicancc of Lhc cdllcalional effect on NHC participation rates in both the median and robust regession cstimntcs thnt Make usc or dl ffcrcnced dala.
iii. Median and robust regression: robustness of the contribution results
The median and robust regression results for contribution rates appear in Table 8 . The The bottom panel of table 8 presents median and robust regression results for contribution rates using difference data. The effect of frequent seminars on NHC contribution rates is still reasonably strong, and similar to that obtained using OLS. None of the olhcr seminar dummies depicted in this Io\ver panel achieves statistical signi ficancc, The estimated effect of frequent seminars on the HC contribution rate is actually ncgati~e and fairly Iargc in magnitude. but not vc~precise. Ho\vever, as \vith the previous specifications, \vhcn the seminar intcnsit> variable is used. median and robust regression estimates of the seminar effect for NHC employees are similar in magnitude to the OLS results and statistically significant at the usual levels of confidence.
iv. Tobii regression re,slllls
Tobit results for rates or participation appear in the last section of Table 7 . The coefficients for both frequent and occasional seminars increase in size (relative to OLS) for all three employee groups. The most tiamatic change occurs in the coefficient for frequent seminars for HC employees, which increases from 6.4 to 10,5. This result is nol surprising gi~cn lhc fact that more than 30 percent of the HC observations are right-censored, Although precision is somclfhat lower for the Tobit estimates than for OLS, the coefficient of frequent seminars for NHC employees remains significant at the 1 percent level, and the coefficient for HC employees remains significant at the 5 pcrccnt Icvcl. These results suggest that censoring causes a downward bias in the OLS cocfficicnts, and that HC and NHC employees respond to education more similarly than the OLS results appear to indicate. Again, using the seminar intensity variable results in more precisely estimated effects.
Conclusions
In this paper, \vc ha~c cxnmincd Lhceffects of employer-based retirement education on 40 l(k) activity using finm-level data. Ollr rcsulls indicntc [Ilo[ rclircment seminars are generally associated with si~ificantly higher rates of participnlion and contributions. at Icast when the frequency of these offerings is high. The effect appears to be particularly slrong for non-highly compensated employees. Our findings reflect both cross-sectional and longitudinal pattcms in the data, and they are robust with respect to a variety of estimation techniques.
The current paper is complcmcnton' to Bcmheim and Garrett (1 996) who use household survey data to investigate the effects O( education on total saving, both inside and outside of pension plans. However, since their data are cross-sectional, the} are forced to make indirect inferences concerning the probable direction of biases that might result from the inevitable failure to control for unobserved individual effects. With household sumcy data, it is also difficult to distinguish bct~veen the effects of education on behavior, and the effects of education on [hc \\ay that indi~'idua]s report behavior. In contrast, the employer survey data used here allow us LOexamine bolh cross-sectional and longitudinal patterns; moreover, there is relatively little risk 26 that the education ofemplo!ccs~vould affect the }vay lhat employers report rates of participation and contributions. The tradeoff. ofcoursc. is that cmplo!'er sumey data provide no information on assets held outside of pension plans, ond thcrcforc do not permit us to investigate \vhether increased participation and contributions reflect nc~t saving, rather Lhan asset reshuffling.
Taken together, [he current paper and that of Bcmheim and Garrett ( 1996) suggest that financial education in the \vorkplacc con exert a strong influence on personal financial decisions. More generally, these studies raise the possibility [hat lhc cnhanccmcnt ofdccision-making skills (as opposed to labor market skills) may conslilutc a sigllificnnt economic rctum to education. . 
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